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ONLINE APPENDIX
1 A Note on Hedge Fund Contracts
As we described in Section 2, a typical hedge fund contract speciﬁes a pair (w, β) which
represents a watermark w and a share β of proﬁts above watermark that managers keeps
for himself. We will show below that, if β ≥ β¯ > 01, then there exists an equilibrium in
which all the funds are invested in the risky project.
We will show that we can sustain an equilibrium in which both managers propose con-
tract with w = Rr, β ∈ [β¯, 1] and invest in the risky project.
First, similarly to the Result 1, if w > w∗ then a manager will prefer to invest in the
risky project because
Πmanagerw,β,safe < Π
manager
w,β,risky ⇔ psβ(Rs − w) < prβ(Rr − w)
⇔ w > w∗ = psRs − prRr
ps − pr
Thus, when an investor gives his funds to a manager that promised w = Rr, his funds
will be invested in the risky project.
To sustain the equilibrium proposed above, the only deviation that we need to rule
out is the one in which one of the managers proposes w = w∗ and β′ ∈ [β¯, 1]. If this
proposal attracts the investor, then it is clearly beneﬁcial for the manager because it
gives him/her positive expected proﬁts, as opposed to the zero proﬁts which is what
he/she earns following strategy w = Rr and β ∈ [β¯, 1]. However, this deviation will
attract the investor only if Πinvestorw=Rr,β < Π
investor
w=w∗,β′ . Thus, to rule out this deviation we
need to make sure that Πinvestorw=Rr,β ≥ Πinvestorw=w∗,β′ . But:
pr ·Rr ≥ ps ·
[
w∗ + (1− β′)(Rs − w∗)
] ⇔ β′ ≥ β∗ = psRs − prRr
ps(Rs − w∗)
Thus if β∗ < β¯ then for any β′ ∈ [β¯, 1], there exists an equilibrium in which all the funds
received from an investor are allocated to the risky project. We interpret therefore the
assumption that β = 1, which we adopted in the paper, as a simpliﬁcation of the analysis.
1In fact, in the hedge fund markets, managers typically keep 15 − 25% of returns exceeding the
watermarks. Thus, we will focus on the situation in which this share β is bounded away from zero.
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2 Individual Behavior Analysis
We present here regression analysis that investigates individual behavior of subjects
playing the roles of managers and investors in order to detect learning that occurs dur-
ing the course of the experiment. In particular, we ask how the decisions in a current
round depend on the experience of each party in the preceding round(s).
Recall that managers compete for the scarce investment opportunity by choosing two
features of the contract: (1) the share of proﬁts, or the watermark that represents in-
vestor’s proﬁts in case investment is successful, and (2) the type of the project (safe or
risky) in which funds will be invested. To understand the determinants of the contract
proposed by a manager, we run two regressions for each treatment. The ﬁrst regression
is the linear OLS regression, in which we regress watermark w (or share β) oﬀered by
manager i in period t on the type of investment manager i chose in periods t and t− 1,
returns promised to an investor by manager i and his competitor j in the previous pe-
riod as well as the dummy variables that capture whether manager i received funds in
the previous period and if yes whether the project he invested in defaulted or not. The
second regression is the Probit regression in which the dependent variable takes value 1
if manager i chose risky project in period t and zero otherwise. We do this separately
for each contractual environment and cluster observations by session. The results are
reported in Tables 1 and 2.
We perform a similar exercise to study individual behavior of investors. In all treatments,
an investor observes returns promised by two competing managers and chooses whom
to give his investment chip. Depending on the treatment, an investor can or cannot
observe the type of the project his funds will be invested in in addition to the promised
returns. To understand investors’ decision-making process, we run Probit regression for
each treatment separately. The dependent variable takes value 1 if an investor chose to
allocate funds to manager i and zero otherwise; the right-hand side variables include all
observables of proposed contracts. The results are reported in Table 3.
While there is some variation between contractual environments, the main determinants
of managers’ and investors’ decisions remain relatively stable. We start with the be-
havior of managers. In all environments except the Cap on Watermark one, managers
tend to oﬀer higher returns to an investor following higher shares they oﬀered in the
previous period, as well as higher shares their competitor oﬀered in the previous period.
Moreover, in the Baseline and Transparency treatments, managers partially compensate
investor for choosing risky projects by oﬀering a premium over the returns they oﬀer in
case they plan to invest funds in the safe project. Interestingly, while in all treatments
managers adjust down promised returns and the likelihood of making risky investment
in period t after winning the competition for funds in period t− 1, managers do not in
general change their behavior after defaulting in period t − 1 which happens primarily
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if they chose risky in the previous period.2 In other words, high default rates associ-
ated with the risky investments in the past do not discourage managers to choose risky
projects in the future. Finally, we note that time trend is relatively weak in all treat-
ments compared to other forces that determine managers’ choices.3
Next, we investigate behavior of investors summarized in Table 3. In all four contractual
environments, investors observe the returns promised by two competing managers before
making their choice. In addition, in the Transparency treatment investors also observe
whether their funds will be invested in the safe or risky project. With an exception of Cap
on Watermark treatment in which both managers propose the highest possible returns of
w = 3, in all other treatments investors choose to allocate their funds to a manager who
promises higher returns. The ability to observe investment type in the Transparency
treatment gives investors the opportunity to indicate their preferred project type and
at least partially control the level of risk they are willing to incur. As regressions indi-
cate, investors use this channel extensively, by allocating the funds to a manager that
commits to the safe project. In fact, variables that capture the project types have the
biggest magnitude among all other determinants of investors decisions. This, coupled
with the above presented above evidence about inability of managers to resist the com-
petition and restrain from making risky investments, explains why we observe such a
low level of risky investments in the Transparency treatment compared to the other ones.
2The only exception is the likelihood of choosing risky investment in period t if manager defaulted in
period t− 1 in the Baseline treatment.
3Time trend is signiﬁcant only in Cap on Watermarks treatment and in one of the two regressions in
Transparency and Risk Sharing treatments.
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Linear Regression: dependent variable is watermark w oﬀered by manager i in period t (wi(t))
Probit: dependent variable = 1 if manager i chose risky project in period t and 0 otherwise
Baseline Transparency Cap on Watermark
wi(t)
risky
project
wi(t)
risky
project
wi(t)
risky
project
Period t
0.002
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.028∗∗
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.014)
0.003∗∗
(0.001)
0.015∗∗
(0.007)
wi(t− 1) 0.600
∗∗
(0.046)
-0.015
(0.020)
0.398∗∗
(0.069)
-0.037
(0.105
0.255
(0.092
-0.376∗∗
(0.134)
wj(t− 1) 0.198
∗∗
(0.054)
0.094∗∗
(0.040)
0.080∗∗
(0.021)
0.022
(0.028)
0.092
(0.045)
-0.175
(0.192)
i received funds
at t− 1
-0.235∗∗
(0.037)
-0.042
(0.106)
-0.133∗∗
(0.024)
-0.172∗∗
(0.057)
-0.005
(0.010)
-0.144∗∗
(0.071)
i received funds
and defaulted
at t− 1
0.059
(0.066)
-0.295∗∗
(0.146)
0.018
(0.078)
0.167
(0.099)
-0.013
(0.018)
0.076
(0.229)
i chose risky
project at t− 1
-0.388∗∗
(0.096)
1.451∗∗
(0.263)
-0.762∗∗
(0.149)
0.876∗∗
(0.201)
-0.027
(0.015)
1.085∗∗
(0.248)
i chose risky
project at t
0.687∗∗
(0.091)
1.447∗∗
(0.107)
0.033∗∗
(0.007)
Const
1.038
(0.373)
-0.872
(0.473)
2.121∗∗
(0.174)
-0.769
(0.590)
1.908∗∗
(0.235)
0.738∗∗
(0.168)
# of obs 912 912 950 950 798 798
# of clusters 4 4 4 4 4 4
(pseudo) R-squared 0.57 0.20 0.54 0.08 0.19 0.13
Root MSE 0.72 0.65 0.17
Log Likelihood -490.62 -462.03 -455.41
Table 1: Regressions for managers in Baseline, Transparency and Cap on Watermark
Robust std errors are in the parentheses. We cluster observations by session.
∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
4
Linear Regression: dependent variable is share β (in %) oﬀered by manager i in period t (βi(t))
Probit: dependent variable = 1 if manager i chose risky project in period t and 0 otherwise
Risk Sharing
βi(t)
risky
project
Period t
0.307∗∗
(0.086)
-0.007
(0.010)
βi(t− 1) 0.459
∗∗
(0.015)
0.004
(0.003)
βj(t− 1) 0.237
∗∗
(0.024)
0.005
(0.003)
i received funds
at t− 1
-0.383
(0.456)
-0.139∗∗
(0.068)
i received funds
and defaulted
at t− 1
0.368
(0.649)
-0.319∗∗
(0.110)
i chose risky
project at t− 1
0.365
(1.100)
1.220∗∗
(0.118)
i chose risky
project at t
-1.060
(0.907)
Const
17.386∗∗
(2.467)
-1.115∗∗
(0.215)
# of obs 988 988
# of clusters 4 4
(pseudo) R-squared 0.51 0.15
Root MSE 9.07
Log Likelihood -562.96
Table 2: Regressions for managers in Risk Sharing treatment
Robust std errors are in the parentheses. We cluster observations by session.
∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
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Probit: dependent variable = 1 if investor allocated his investment chip to manager i in period t and 0
if he allocated his chip to manager j
Baseline Transparency Cap on Watermark Risk Sharing
Promisei(t) ≥ Promisej(t) 0.896
∗∗
(0.313)
2.018∗∗
(0.213)
0.945
(0.0.793)
1.056∗∗
(0.272)
Promisej(t) > Promisei(t)
-1.181∗∗
(0.207)
-0.711∗∗
(0.199)
-0.680
(0.793)
-0.853∗∗
(0.166)
Promisei(t)
-0.0040
(0.109)
0.848∗∗
(0.077)
1.339
(0.980)
0.022
(0.018)
Promisej(t)
-0.183∗∗
(0.053)
-0.614∗∗
(0.078)
-0.679
(0.751)
-0.025
(0.020)
i chose safe project
and j chose risky one
3.604∗∗
(0.434)
i chose risky project
and j chose safe one
-3.396∗∗
(0.129)
Const
-0.586
(0.488)
-2.108∗∗
(0.458)
-1.817
(1.128)
0.056
(0.457)
# of obs 480 500 420 520
# of clusters 4 4 4 4
(pseudo) R-squared 0.29 0.58 0.11 0.42
Log Likelihood -236.81 -146.46 -243.16 -207.47
Table 3: Regressions for investors in all treatments
Robust std errors are in the parentheses. We cluster observations by session.
∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
Promise of the manager is the watermark w in Baseline, Cap on Watermark and Transparency
treatments and it is share β in Risk Sharing treatment.
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